In 2024, Mexico became the United States' largest trading partner for the second consecutive year—$840 billion in total trade, the highest annual total any country has ever recorded with the United States. Everyone sees this. What they're missing is the mispricing.
Mexican manufacturing attracted $19.9 billion in FDI in 2024—over half of all foreign investment in the country [1]. In the first nine months of 2025 alone, Mexico attracted $40.9 billion in total FDI, already surpassing the entire 2024 total [2].
Meanwhile, U.S. lower middle market industrial businesses—companies with enterprise values under $500 million—trade at an average of 7.2x EBITDA [3]. Manufacturing specifically? 5.8x EBITDA [4].
The market is pricing these assets as if nearshoring is speculative. The data shows it's structural.
A Mexican manufacturer with USMCA-certified automotive supply, existing Gulf Cooperation Council distribution relationships, and ISO certifications can serve three underserved markets simultaneously:
1. North American nearshoring demand
$840 billion in U.S.-Mexico trade in 2024. This isn't a forecast—it already happened.
2. USMCA-compliant automotive supply chains
75% of automobile content must originate in North America under treaty requirements to qualify for zero tariffs [5]. Existing USMCA-compliant manufacturers have de facto oligopoly on certified supply. New entrants face 18-24 month certification timelines.
3. GCC localization mandates
Saudi Vision 2030 requires 50% local content for government procurement by 2030 [6]. Gulf nations lack intermediate manufacturing capacity to meet these mandates without partners. Mexican manufacturers with existing GCC distribution relationships and USMCA compliance can serve both markets.
Current market pricing for Mexican manufacturing assets: 5.8x EBITDA
U.S. manufacturing comparables: 6.5x to 7.2x EBITDA—and that's without multi-jurisdictional optionality [3][4]
Strategic buyers building nearshoring platforms: Higher still
The arbitrage: 24% upside to U.S. comparables, before accounting for geographic optionality.
Bloomberg reported in January 2025 that Trump planned to impose 25% tariffs on Mexican imports by February 1st [7]. He did—then suspended USMCA-compliant goods two days later [8].
The market sees this volatility as risk. We see it as validation.
When tariffs get threatened—and they will—companies don't reduce nearshoring exposure. They increase it. Tariff uncertainty makes single-country supply chains riskier, not safer.
Multi-jurisdictional manufacturers with the ability to shift production across borders to optimize costs become more valuable in tariff-volatile environments, not less.
Three systemic blind spots:
1. Institutional LPs don't underwrite geopolitical complexity
Most PE LPs have zero emerging market allocation mandates. A Mexican manufacturer serving GCC markets gets classified as "international" and excluded—despite 70%+ revenue from U.S. customers.
2. Family-owned businesses have zero institutional documentation
The best assets are third-generation operators with 40-year customer relationships, 20%+ EBITDA margins, and zero audited financials. Institutional buyers need audited financials for credit committee approval. We don't. Structural advantage.
3. Cross-border optionality isn't modeled
Standard LMM diligence models single-country revenue. Multi-jurisdictional manufacturing optionality—shifting production to optimize tariffs, labor costs, or proximity—has zero NPV credit in traditional models. But it's worth 15-25% of enterprise value in a 10-year hold with tariff volatility.
What we're building:
Third-generation family operators. Forty-year customer relationships. Twenty-percent-plus EBITDA margins. Proprietary tooling creating eighteen to twenty-four month switching costs. And zero institutional documentation.
Most PE firms see that as a disqualifier. We see it as a structural advantage. No credit committee complications. No seller expectations anchored to public market multiples. Just direct negotiation with operators who want succession planning, not a bidding war.
Most PE firms are chasing growth at 12.8x EBITDA multiples for deals over $1 billion [9]. We're buying irreplaceable manufacturing infrastructure at 5.8x during the largest supply chain reconfiguration in fifty years.
Most PE firms optimize for IRR. We optimize for businesses that can't be rebuilt.
Lower middle market. Industrial focus. Geopolitical arbitrage.
Plocamium Holdings — Manufacturing resilience as an asset class.
[1] Mexico Economy Ministry (SE), "Preliminary 2024 FDI Data," February 2025. Manufacturing sector received $19.88 billion in FDI in 2024.
[2] Mexico Economy Ministry, "Foreign Direct Investment Report Q1-Q3 2025," November 2025. Total FDI reached $40.906 billion through September 2025.
[3] GF Data, "February 2025 Report," gfdata.com. Average TEV/EBITDA multiple for companies with enterprise values under $500M was 7.2x in 2024.
[4] GF Data, "H1 2025 Small Deals Report," November 2025. Manufacturing deal volume averaged 5.8x TEV/EBITDA in H1 2025.
[5] USMCA Agreement, Chapter 4: Rules of Origin, Article 4.5 (Automotive Goods), effective July 1, 2020.
[6] Saudi Vision 2030, National Industrial Development and Logistics Program (NIDLP), "Local Content Mandate Targets," updated June 2023.
[7] Bloomberg News, "Donald Trump Plans to Enact 25% Tariffs on Mexico, Canada by Feb. 1," January 21, 2025.
[8] The White House, "Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Adjusts Tariffs on Canada and Mexico," March 6, 2025. USMCA-compliant goods exempted from 25% tariff.
[9] PitchBook, "2025 Allocator Solution: Private Market Opportunities," February 2025. Median EV/EBITDA multiple for buyouts worth $1 billion or more rose to 15.5x in 2024, compared with 12.8x for deals of less than $1 billion.